Appendix

Food Comes First, Then Morals: Redistribution Preferences, Parochial Altruism and Immigration in Western Europe

David Rueda

Professor of Comparative Politics

Department of Politics & IR and Nuffield College, University of Oxford

david.rueda@politics.ox.ac.uk

A. Redistribution preferences

Table A.1: Redistribution preferences

Strongly Agree	Agree	Neither Agree Nor Disagree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
26.64	43.79	14.64	12.37	2.56

Notes: Average percentages per category. ESS, Rounds 1-6.

B. Robustness tests

Several robustness tests are reported in Table B.2, they use model (2), including control variables, from Table 2 in the main text and focus on the estimates of interest, the average predicted probabilities of supporting redistribution for the poor and the rich (defined the same way as in Table 3) conditional on population heterogeneity. Table B.2 summarizes three types of robustness tests. Tests (1) to (9) explore the sensitivity of the main results (reproduced on the first line for convenience) to the inclusion of a battery of additional control variables. Tests (10) to (12) replace the immigration variable in the main model for alternative measures of population heterogenenity. And tests (13) to (17) present results from estimating alternative models.

Ideology: The main analysis in Table 2 excludes a measure of ideology. The reason for this is that the starting point for most political economy analyses of redistribution is the consideration that economic preferences are a key constituent of ideology. Preferences are part of ideology (being affected by income and, in turn, affecting political behavior outcomes like voting). Ideology, therefore, is not considered an 'explanatory' variable in the main model. Nonetheless, it has been argued that ideological positions may be an independent source of redistribution preferences (see, for example, Margalit 2013) and it can be shown that the effects present in the main model are robust to the inclusion of this variable. The measure of ideology in the European Social Survey captures respondents' self-placement on a scale between 0 (far to the left) and 10 (far to the right). This type of measure has been widely used in the literature before (for

Table B.2: Support for Redistribution: Robustness Tests

Average Predicted Probabilities for Poor and Rich Conditional on Population Heterogeneity				
	Low Foreign-Born Population		High Foreign-Born Population	
	Poor	Rich	Poor	Rich
Main model	0.83**	0.77**	0.71**	0.60**
Adding control variables				
(1) Ideology	0.81**	0.76**	0.70**	0.61**
(2) Fear of crime	0.83**	0.77**	0.71**	0.60**
(3) Macro inequality	0.79**	0.75**	0.72**	0.65**
(4) Urbanization	0.83**	0.77**	0.71**	0.60**
(5) Transfer classes	0.83**	0.77**	0.71**	0.60**
(6) Unemployment (nat)	0.83**	0.77**	0.70**	0.59**
(7) Great Recession (2008-2012)	0.84**	0.76**	0.75**	0.61**
(8) Occupational unemp	0.85**	0.80**	0.70**	0.55**
(9) Altruism	0.83**	0.78**	0.70**	0.59**
Alternative heterogeneity measures				
(10) Foreign-born unemployed	0.76**	0.68**	0.76**	0.65**
(11) Ethnic minority poor	0.78**	0.71**	0.75**	0.65**
(12) Attitudes about immigration	0.78**	0.71**	0.75**	0.64**
Alternative models				
(13) Multiple imputation	0.79**	0.72**	0.73**	0.63**
(14) No top income	0.84**	0.78**	0.72**	0.59**
(15) Income as % of mean	0.83**	0.77**	0.71**	0.59**
(16) 3 levels	0.78**	0.71**	0.76**	0.66**
(17) Strongly agree	0.30**	0.23**	0.29**	0.20**

Notes: See Table 3 in main text.

an example looking at the welfare state, see Kumlin 2007) and it has been found to influence political behavior (see Van der Eijk et al. 2005). The results of test (1) in Table B.2 show the main findings of the article not to be affected by the inclusion of ideology.

Fear of crime and macro inequality: Some recent contributions to the literature on the political economy of redistribution demands have focused on the effects of macro inequality. More concretely, they have argued that if individuals are concerned about the negative externalities of inequality (such as crime or political and social instability), increases in inequality may promote support for redistribution as a way to reduce these externalities. The argument in Rueda and Stegmueller (2016) is particularly germane to this article's analysis, as it proposes that longer time horizons and lower stakes (in relation to current tax and transfer considerations) mean that the negative externalities of inequality will be more important to the rich than to the poor. Using ESS data similar to this article's, Rueda and Stegueller show that the rich in more unequal regions in Western Europe are more supportive of redistribution than the rich in more equal regions because of their concern with crime. To the extent that macro inequality may be related to levels of ethnic heterogeneity, the relationships proposed in this article and the arguments in Rueda and Stegmueller (2016) have similar empirical implications. I first conduct robustness test (2) including the key variable of Rueda and Stegmueller's analysis: an individual's fear of crime (as a micro-level manifestation of the externalities of inequality). In this specification (as in Rueda and Stegmueller's), fear of crime is captured by a survey item asking respondents if they are afraid of walking alone in the dark in their neighborhood. Test (2) shows that its inclusion does not appreciably alter the main results.

In test (3), a measure of macro inequality is introduced into the analysis. Inequality in this test does not only serve as a macro proxy for the potential effects of negative externalities (not only fear of crime, explicitly measured in the previous analysis, but also more general political and social problems). It is also relevant to arguments about altruism as captured by an aggregate welfare function. There are two ways of thinking about altruism or other-regarding preferences in the political economy

literature. As mentioned in the main text, a common approach is to understands other-regarding concerns to be affected by a "contextual" logic. In these arguments, other-regarding preferences are inevitably linked to macro levels of inequality. When altruism is significant, as the allocation of material payoffs become more equitable, the utility of individuals increases (see, for example, Fehr and Gächter 2000). Test (3) includes the Gini coefficient for equivalized disposable income provided by Eurostat.[1] In spite of the smaller sample (missing data for 2002), the results with this additional control variable are substantively similar to those in the main model.

Urbanization: The link between redistribution and political geography has received a significant amount of attention in the political economy literature. This is particularly the case regarding arguments about the distinctiveness of individual preferences in high-density, urban areas (see, for example, Cho et al. 2006). As argued by Rodden (2010: 322), individuals may sort themselves into neighborhoods with similar demographic, occupational, income, and ultimately political preferences. To address this issue, I include an individual-level survey variable, which indicates if the respondent lives in an urban region.[2] Specifications (4) in Table B.2 shows that the urbanization measure does not change this article's core results.

Transfer classes: In addition to class (already included as a control variable in the main analysis), certain socio-economic characteristics may influence individual support for redistribution. This is particularly the case for those respondents whose position is related to the generosity of the welfare state, what Jæger (2006) refers to as "transfer classes.". Test (5) therefore includes dummy variables that distinguish among those working, unemployed, retired or disabled, and not in the labor force. This specification does not modify the main substantive effects described in the main text.

[1] Eurostat uses data from the EU-SILC survey. Note that data for 2002 are not available for any of the countries in the sample. For details, see http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data/database.

[2] The ESS question asks respondents whether they live in "A big city," "Suburbs or outskirts of big city," "Town or small city," "Country village," or "Farm or home in countryside."

Domestic unemployment and the Great Recession: The increasing levels of immigration in Western Europe (and their politization) have been associated with growing concerns about competition by the native populations (see, for example, Andersen and Bjørklund 1990, Faist 1994 or De Koster et al. 2013). This process, often referred to as "welfare chauvinism," can usefully be described as "the fear among groups in the native population (and settled immigrants) that certain new immigrant groups take away jobs, housing and social services" (Faist 1994: 440). I introduce the levels of unemployment among the native population as a control for the competition effects of immigration.[3] The idea here is that higher levels of domestic unemployment would promote higher concerns about the possibility that immigrants may be taking aways jobs or limiting the generosity of welfare benefits.

It is easy to see how economic crisis (particularly when accompanied by fiscal austerity) could affect both sides of the economic competition argument. As economic circumstances worsen (and governments cut spending), support for redistribution could be affected by anti-immigrant sentiment among individuals who are concerned about competing for jobs with immigrants willing to work for lower wages (and under worse conditions) or about concerns with welfare benefit competition. To test whether respondents were affected by the global economic downturn (and whether the crisis made redistributive preferences idiosyncratic), I estimate a model using a subsample of the data comprised of surveys conducted during the Great Recession (2008, 2010 and 2012).[4]

Test (6) in Table B.2 shows that the inclusion of the domestic unemployment control variable does not affect the main findings in the article. Regarding the effect of the Great Recession, in specification (7) the support for redistribution of both the poor and the rich when the level of foreign-born population is low is as high during the

[3] Data available from the OECD International migration database: https://data.oecd.org/migration/foreign-born-population.htm.

[4] The reader should keep in mind that the ESS 2008 surveys were conducted from late 2008 (starting in August, September or October in most countries) to early 2009 (concluding as early as January but as late as June depending on the country).

crisis as it was in the whole sample. When foreign-born population is high, the support for redistribution of the rich is very similar during the Great Recession. But the support of the poor is actually higher in the Great Recession than in the whole sample with high levels of population heterogeneity. While this result seems to militate against the argument that crisis reduces the support of the poor for redistribution (even when the number of out-group members is high), it nevertheless confirms the relevance of this article's main argument.

Occupational unemployment: An influential literature in comparative political economy has argued that redistribution preferences are affected by the demand for insurance against an uncertain future (Moene and Wallerstein 2001; Iversen and Soskice 2001; Rehm 2009). A related set of arguments connects ethnic identity to risk. The basic intuition in this approach is that some identity groups may be linked to particular profiles regarding risk, mobility, etc (as in Piketty 1995 or Benabou and Ok 2001). Consequently, where the poor are different from the rich, the rich may feel less vulnerable to risk. To address these concerns, I introduce an explicit measure of risk into the analysis. An important component of the demand for insurance and redistribution has to do with the risk of becoming unemployed. In test (8) in Table B.2, I operationalize risk as specific skills. Iversen and Soskice (2001) argue that individuals who have made risky investments in specific skills will demand insurance against the possible future loss of income from those investments. Following Rehm (2009), the variable in test (8) measures skill-specific risk as occupational unemployment rates.[5] Controlling for this kind of insurance motivations again makes little difference to the substantive effects discussed in the article.[6]

[5] I am indebted to Philipp Rehm for providing occupational unemployment rate measures at the ISCO 1 level.

[6] Since the argument about risk implies that insurance motivations could be conditional on the level of heterogeneity, I also add the interaction between occupational unemployment and foreign-born population in an alternative model. The results (available from the author) are the same as those reported in Table B.2.

Altruism: As mentioned above, altruism in this article is considered a contextual factor. An alternative approach to other-regarding concerns takes its inspiration from work in psychology and considers them a personality trait.[7] This research has often taken the form of a self-reported measure (the Self-Report Altruism, SRA, Scale) aggregating different items capturing an individual's engagement in altruistic behaviours (pushing a stranger's car out of the snow, giving money to a charity, etc). The European Social Survey employs a version of the Portrait Values Questionnaire (Schwartz 2003). It measures values indirectly by asking respondents to listen to a description of different kinds of persons and to declare whether these persons are (or are not) like them. The descriptions address the values specified in the Schwartz (1992) model of basic individual values.[8] Each portrait describes a person's goals and aspirations addressing implicitly or explicitly the importance of a value.[9] Test (9) in Table B.2 shows that, even controlling for this measure of altruism as personality trait, the effects hypothesized in this article are clearly present.

Foreign-born unemployed and ethnic minority poor: Tests (10) and (11)[10] explore the robustness of this article's main results to alternative measures of population heterogeneity. In some ways, the main measure of heterogeneity used in the article's analysis is not ideal. As should be clear from the argument in previous sections, I

[7] See, for example, the research on altruistic personality by Rushton et al. (1981).

[8] Schwartz (1992) develops a model of 10 individual values that form two dimensions. The dimension that matters to the topic of this article, captures the two extremes of "self-enhancement" (personal success, self-interest, control of resources and people) and "self-transcendence" (valuing the welfare of close and distant others and the environment, tolerating differences, and transcending selfishness).

[9] For altruism, the portrait used in the analysis below is as follows: "She/he thinks it is important that every person in the world should be treated equally. She/he believes everyone should have equal opportunities in life." Respondents can then decide whether this person is "Very much like me," "Like me," "Somewhat like me," "A little like me," "Not like me," or "Not like me at all." Those answering "Very much like me" are coded as altruistic.

[10] Note that for tests (10) to (12) the column headings for "Low" and "High Foreign-Born Population" no longer applies (since these estimates use alternative measures of heterogeneity).

am conceptually interested in how different the poor (as potential beneficiaries of redistributive policies) are from the majority population. As mentioned in the main text the measure of foreign-born population is highly correlated to the percentage of self-defined foreign-born individuals below the income mean, but an ideal measure would capture the concentration of foreign-born individuals among the poor directly. Test (10) represents an attempt to do this by focusing on the levels of unemployment among the foreign-born. The specific measure used is the number of foreign-born unemployed as a percentage of a country's total population.[11] The logic behind this choice of measure is clear. The higher the number of out-group members who are potential recipients of (and not contributors to) the benefits of redistribution, the less likely in-group members will be to support it. While the results of test (10) are different from the main results in the article, they reflect similar patterns. The poor are still not very affected by this form of heterogeneity. They are less supportive when foreign-born unemployment is low, but equally supportive when it is high. The rich are much less supportive of redistribution when foreign-born unemployment is low, but still significantly less supportive when foreign-born unemployment is high.

A similar conclusion can be extracted from test (11). In this case, the alternative explanatory variable is the proportion of self-defined members of an ethnic minority within the poor. The ESS asks respondents whether they belong to a minority ethnic group in their country. The variable used in test (11) reflects the number of those who answer yes and whose incomes are below the national mean (making them potential beneficiaries of redistribution). While this is a survey-based measure (and the number of self-defined members of an ethnic minority in the ESS is low and sensitive to minor changes), the results of test (11) confirm the article's main findings.

Attitudes about immigration: Test (12) provides an even more strict test for an alternative measure of heterogeneity by using an individual measure of attitudes about immigration (whether it is perceived as positive or negative). An important implication of the argument presented in the main text is that attitudes towards migrants should

[11] Data available from the OECD International migration database: https://data.oecd.org/migration/foreign-born-population.htm.

have a stronger impact on redistribution preferences among the rich. While it is possible that the poor have strong anti-migrant sentiments, their material interests (if the argument is correct) should keep them from translating these sentiments into lower redistribution preferences. The rich, however, should be able to "afford" the translation of pro-immigrant sentiments into higher redistribution preferences. To address this issue, I turn to a question in the ESS asking respondents whether their country "is made a worse or a better place to live by people coming to live here from other countries." Answers range from 0 ("Worse place to live") to 10 ("Better place to live"). The estimates in Table B.2 compare the average predicted probabilities for those in the 10% and 90% percentiles in the distribution of attitudes about immigration.[12] The results are remarkably similar to those in the main text. For the poor, having positive or negative attitudes towards immigration makes much less of a difference in their redistribution preferences than for the rich. Whether we analyze objective immigration levels or individual attitudes towards immigration, we reach the same conclusions.

Multiple imputation Regarding the sensitivity of the main results to alternative estimation models, I begin by using multiple imputation to address missing values. It is well known that listwise deletion or various 'value substitution' methods might produce biased estimates and standard errors that are too small (Allison 2001; King et al. 2001; Little and Rubin 2002). Using multiple imputation we not only obtain complete data sets but (more importantly) generate conservative standard errors reflecting uncertainty due to missing data (Rubin 1987, 1996). An additional advantage of using multiple imputation is that I can use auxiliary variables that are not used in the main analysis to predict missing responses, yielding so called "superefficient" imputations (Rubin 1996). As additional predictors I include the ideology, fear of crime and urbanization variables described above. I also include the number of people living regularly as members of the household, assessments of subjective health and general happiness, and a question about the respondent's feelings about the household's

[12] The 10% percentile of the attitudes about immigration distribution corresponds to a 2 answer. The 90% to an 8 answer.

income. Multiple imputations are created by random draws from a multivariate normal posterior distribution for the missing data conditional on the observed data (King et al. 2001). These draws are used to generate five complete (i.e., imputed) data sets. The analysis is then performed on each of these five data sets and then averaged with standard error adjusted to reflect the uncertainty of the imputed values (Rubin 1987). The results (consistent with the main findings in the article) are presented in test (13).

No top income and income difference as percentage of mean: Tests (14) and (15) focus on alternative measures for the relative income variable. As mentioned in the main text, the top category for income in the ESS has no upper limit. To define a midpoint for this open-ended top category, I extrapolate from the next-to-last category's midpoint using the frequencies of both the next-to-last and last (open-ended) categories, using the formula suggested in Hout (2004). These frequencies, however, are low in some countries which makes the midpoints for this top category sensitive to minor changes (and vulnerable to extreme values, particularly from 2002 to 2006, when when there are more income categories and fewer respondents in the top ones). To confirm the robustness of the article's main results, I run an analysis in which the top category for the income measure is simply dropped.[13] The results in test (14) make clear that the main findings in this article are not dependent on the highest income category.

I also use another alternative measure of relative income: the distance between an individual's income and the mean in her country-year as a percentage of the mean in her country-year. This is measured in local currency (and not PPP-adjusted dollars). The income distribution for the countries in the sample is, for obvious reasons, quite different when using this alternative measure. The poor now are 70% below the mean (the 10th percentile in the main sample) and the rich are 84% above (the 90th percentile). But the results in test (15) are almost identical to the main ones in the article.

[13] Note that this also implies that the mean income, and the relative income as a difference to the mean, need to be recalculated.

3-level estimation: As mentioned in the main text, the data used in this article's analysis has a multi-level structure. In the main results, two levels were considered (individuals nested within countries). In test (16), the robustness of the results is explored by estimating a 3-level structure (individuals nested within years, nested within countries). As before, I estimate logit models with random country intercepts via maximum likelihood. The average predicted probabilities in test (16) are slightly different from those in this article's main model (the likelihood of supporting redistribution is generally higher when the level of foreign-born population is high). But the patterns in Figure 6 in the main text are still present.

Strongly agree: In the main analysis, the dependent variable takes the value of 1 if the respondent indicates that she either "agrees" or "strongly agrees" that "the government should take measures to reduce differences in income levels." In test (17) I analyze a more restrictive definition of support for redistribution (only strong agreements). Table 1 in the main text made clear that there is a high level of overall support for redistribution among West Europeans when we look at the original measure (with 70% of the respondents either agreeing or strongly agreeing). Support for redistribution is much lower when looking at only strong agreement (27% of respondents). The patterns using this dependent variable in test (17) reflect these lower support levels, but they confirm the findings in the main analysis. The poor are significantly more likely to support redistribution than the rich, and they are unaffected by the levels of foreign-born population (the likelihood to support redistribution in this analysis is 30% with high levels of foreign-born population and 29% with low levels). The support for redistribution by the affluent, on the other hand, is much lower when the level of foreign-born population is high (the likelihood to strongly agree declines from 23% to 20%).

C. Analysis of voting

The definition of main parties of the Left and populist Right parties is not uncontentious. I follow the lead of a number of previous analyses.[14] The main Left parties

[14] See Ivarsflaten (2008), Oesch (2008), Rovny (2013) or Afonso and Rennwald (Forthcoming).

in my ESS sample are: SPÖ (Austria); PS/SP.A, SP.A–Spirit, Vlaams - Progressieven (Belgium); Socialdemokraterne (Denmark); SPD (Germany); PSOE (Spain); Finnish Social Democratic Party (Finland); SPD (France); Labour (UK); PASOK (Greece); Labour (Ireland); PvdA (Netherlands); Labour Party (Norway); PS (Portugal); and Social Democrats (Sweden). Like most of the literature on populist Right party support, there are substantive and statistical reasons to focus the analysis on countries (and elections) where these parties were a viable option for potential voters. While the analysis of the determinants of Left party voting examines the full sample of country-years used in previous sections, the one for populist Right party voting is limited to 8 countries. I code the following parties as populist Right: FPÖ, BZÖ (Austria); Vlaams Blok, Front National (Belgium); Dansk Folkeparti, Fremskridtspartiet (Denmark); True Finns (Finland); Front National, Mouvement National Republicain, Mouvement pour la France (France); LAOS (Greece); List Pim Fortuyn, PVV–List Wilders, TON–List Verdonk (Netherlands); and Progress Party (Norway).

The influence of redistribution preferences is the main focus in the analysis of voting presented in the main text. For this reason, it is of paramount importance that the voting data coincides with the redistribution preferences data. As mentioned in the text, respondents are asked about the parties they voted for in the previous national election. At the time of the survey, these elections have taken place in the past while redistribution preferences are measured in the present. It is important therefore to restrict the analysis to ESS waves when this coincidence of data is reasonable.[15] This also requires special attention to when the surveys were actually conducted. The ESS surveys are fielded over a period of months, often starting at the end of the wave year and running into the following one. In the analysis, I only include ESS surveys when a national election has been held the same year of the wave or the year before (so that redistribution preferences are plausibly connected with voting behavior). I also eliminate surveys that were conducted in months that include an election

[15] The same considerations apply to measures of immigration, relative income, etc, which are controlled for in this part of the article but are the main focus of other analyses of populist right voting using ESS data.

(and therefore may contain voting choices for different elections depending on the respondent's interview date). In practical terms, this means the analysis includes the following ESS surveys: Austria (2002, 2006); Belgium (2004, 2008, 2010); Denmark (2002, 2006, 2008, 2012); Germany (2002, 2006, 2010); Spain (2004, 2008, 2012); Finland (2004, 2008, 2012); France (2002, 2008, 2012); UK (2002, 2006, 2010); Greece (2004, 2010); Ireland (2002, 2008, 2012); Netherlands (2002, 2004, 2010); Norway (2002, 2006, 2010); Portugal (2002, 2006, 2010, 2012); and Sweden (2002, 2006, 2010).

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